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Introduction
The literature on mutual funds has directly addressed the question of whether past performance is informative about future performance. For example, recent studies, which examine public information and managerial skill (Kasperczyk and Seru (2007) ), short measurement periods (Bollen and Busse (2005)) or use a Bayesian framework (Busse and Irvine (2006) ), find strong evidence that funds sustain relative performance beyond expenses or momentum over adjacent periods. The recent evidence on consistent performance by fund managers raises the important question regarding the source of persistence. Most prior work attributes some part of persistence to fund manager skill. However, Baks (2003) decomposes outperformance into manager and fund categories and reports that manager skill accounts for less than half of fund outperformance and that the fund is more important than the manager. If managerial stock picking prowess is the primary driver then why would the fund be a source of relative performance?
Besides research and stock picking abilities, the quality of trade execution can be an important component of fund performance (Keim and Madhavan (1997) ). Portfolio managers rely on buy-side trading desks and sell-side brokerage firms to obtain the best implementation of their investment ideas. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the execution process could at least in part be one source of persistence in institutional performance.
We examine the equity transactions of institutional investors to understand the contribution of the brokers and the buy-side trading desks to institutional performance. The data, compiled by Abel/Noser Corporation, contain approximately 35 million tickets that are initiated by 739 institutional investors and facilitated by 431 brokerage firms over a seven-year period, 1999-2005, representing $22.9 trillion in trading volume. The database is distinctive in that it contains a complete history of each equity ticket (order), each typically resulting in more than one trade, sent by an institutional investor to a broker, including stock identifiers that help obtain relevant data from other sources, and more importantly for this study, codes that identify the broker and the client associated with each ticket. While prior academic research has focused on performance of money managers, there is little empirical work examining whether another category of financial intermediaries, namely brokers, responsible for trillions of dollars in executions each year, can sustain performance over adjacent periods. The detailed transaction level dataset seems particularly well suited for studying patterns in execution performance of brokers and their institutional clients.
Our paper focuses on a literature that examines heterogeneity in transaction costs. Linnainmaa (2007) uses Finnish data to argue for differences in execution costs across retail and institutional broker types. Keim and Madhavan (1997) and Christoffersen, Keim and Musto (2006) show dispersion in trading costs of institutions and mutual funds. Yet, institutional execution is a joint production process that incorporates the decisions of both brokers and their institutional clients. Our paper complements this work with a more extensive set of domestic trading data that allow us to integrate both broker execution and institutional execution into a single framework. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine performance persistence of both buy-side clients and sell-side brokers from the perspective of execution quality. Our analysis provides insights on the linkage between fund performance and trading costs and also has implications for the Best Execution obligation of brokers and institutional investors.
Our measure of execution cost, the execution shortfall, compares the execution price with a benchmark price when the institutional client sent the ticket to the broker. It reflects the bid-ask spread, the market impact, and the cost of any delay by the broker in executing the order but excludes brokerage commissions. For the overall sample, we report average execution shortfall of 26 basis points. We sort brokers based on execution shortfall during portfolio formation month (M) and create quintile portfolios.
It is notable that the dispersion among the top-performing and bottom-performing portfolios resulting from this sorting procedure is economically large, 155 basis points, and statistically significant. More importantly, we find that the patterns in relative performance continue to persist over adjacent periods.
The execution shortfall for bottom performers exceed those for top performers by statistically significant 29 basis points, suggesting that some brokers can deliver better execution consistently over time.
We examine whether economic determinants of execution cost, such as ticket attributes, firm characteristics and market conditions, can explain differences in broker executions. We find that brokers ranked as top performers during portfolio formation month M exhibit the lowest execution shortfall during subsequent periods. The differences across the top and bottom performers continue to be around 28 basis points. These findings suggest that the brokers exhibit significant heterogeneity in execution cost, even after controlling for order difficulty and stock-specific factors, and that the top brokers can sustain their advantage over adjacent periods. Further, we find that the best brokers in our sample can execute tickets with no price impact, which likely reflects the trading skill of the brokerage firm. The latter finding is particularly striking since we examine trades initiated by large institutions.
To relate to the mutual fund persistence literature, we examine whether institutional investors exhibit persistence in trading costs. We find that, similar to brokers, institutional clients with lowest (highest) execution shortfall in month (M) exhibit the lowest (highest) execution shortfall during the next four months. In each of these months, the difference in execution quality across top and bottom performing client quintiles is approximately 62 basis points. Remarkably, the best clients exhibit a persistent pattern of negative execution shortfall, suggesting that the trading desks of the best clients can help create positive (investment) alpha through their trading strategies.
We also examine whether the persistence in broker and client performance is independent, or whether one effect subsumes the other effect. We find that both brokers and clients exhibit independent persistence and that the combined effects are economically large. For example, the difference in execution cost between the [top broker, top client] and the [bottom broker, bottom client] exceeds 100 basis points, suggesting that trading costs can be an important explanation for mutual fund performance persistence. 1 We investigate several possible explanations for the broker and client persistence. Our findings do not indicate that the patterns are driven by client investment style or soft dollar arrangements. We find that the best brokers tend to be boutique rather than generalist and specialize in certain industries. They charge higher commissions but more often split and work the order to obtain consistently better execution. The best performing clients tend to be larger but also concentrate their order flow with fewer 1 Recent studies estimate that the spread in fund performance between top and bottom quintile is around 3 percent to 6 percent per year (see Busse and Irvine (2006) , Kacperczyk et al. (2006) ). Assuming an average annual mutual fund turnover rate of 100 percent (see Edelen et al. (2007) ), trading costs can explain a significant portion of the persistence in fund performance.
brokers. The worst performing clients specify low commission (or 'touch') execution venues, suggesting they focus on explicit costs. However, this choice is sub-optimal and can ultimately cost institutions considerably more in price impact than the savings in commissions. We document that routing decisions are sensitive to past execution quality. The top (bottom) brokers for a client subsequently receive more (less) order flow and have a higher (lower) likelihood of being among the client's top 10 brokers (based on volume). Our evidence suggests that the worst brokers lose market share slowly.
Prior literature has shown that the trading costs for institutional investors are economically large.
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In the context of illiquid stocks, Keim (1999) shows that, over the period 1982-1995, a passive small-cap fund that pays attention not only to tracking error but also to trading cost can earn an annual premium of 2.2% over a pure indexing strategy. Thus, trading cost can be a significant drag on portfolio performance.
We fill some of the gaps in the understanding of institutional investor performance by documenting the magnitude of heterogeneity in trading cost, and more importantly, the persistence in trading cost across institutions. Our findings suggest that mutual fund performance persistence can be explained at least in part by their quality of trade executions, and that the positive risk adjusted performance observed for some funds could be partly attributed to the superior trading strategies of their trading desks.
Best execution has been the subject of recent regulatory attention under U.S. Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) and European Union's Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).
In defining Best Execution, regulators in the U.S. have placed emphasis on the fiduciary duty of brokers and fund managers to obtain the best value for the investment decision. 3 Our findings suggest that the careful evaluation of broker selection based on past performance is an important dimension of meeting a fund manager's best execution obligation. However, because brokers provide a package of non-execution related services to clients (such as prime brokerage services, IPO allocations, and research) and we have no way of measuring these potentially offsetting benefits, it is very difficult in reality to measure Best Execution. Thus, while our findings suggest that certain clients consistently obtain poor executions and can benefit from better rules for broker selection, we cannot necessarily conclude that these decisions violate their Best Execution obligations.
This study is also of interest to institutional trading desks, portfolio managers, regulators and investors. For brokerage firms, our finding that institutional order flow is sensitive to past execution quality suggests that clients are paying close attention to the value of brokerage services. For buy-side trading desks, the ability to create positive (investment) alpha through their trading strategies, and the ability to sustain performance over adjacent periods, should help articulate their contributions to the investment performance. For portfolio managers and mutual fund board members, our findings emphasize that fund performance can be improved by examining choices pertaining to the implementation of investment ideas. Finally, from a regulatory perspective, the study should inform regulatory initiatives such as SEC Concept Release S7-12-03, which considers "whether mutual funds should be required to quantify and disclose to investors the amount of transactions costs they incur, include transaction costs in their expense ratios and fee tables, or provide additional quantitative or narrative disclosure about their transaction costs." Our evidence suggests that increased disclosure on mutual fund's transaction costs can provide useful incremental information to most investors' decision making process.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the prior literature on measuring execution costs of mutual funds and describe the institutional trading process. Execution quality measures and the sample descriptive statistics are presented in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we report the analysis relating to trading cost persistence of brokers and institutional investors. In Section 6, we discuss possible explanations of performance persistence and examine the relation between past executions and institutional order routing. In Section 7, we summarize our findings and conclude.
Literature Review and the Institutional Trading process

Measuring execution costs of mutual fund trades
Prior research has recognized that trading cost can be a drag on managed portfolio performance (see, for example, Carhart (1997) ). However, the previous literature relating mutual fund performance and trading cost has relied predominantly on quarterly ownership data since transaction data for mutual funds are not publicly available. A commonly used measure for trading cost is the mutual fund turnover, defined as the minimum of security purchases and sales over the quarter, scaled by average assets. Turnover is a noisy proxy for execution cost, as it does not properly account for net flow differences across funds, or for the level of implicit trading costs.
Another measure, proposed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and implemented recently by Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2006) , is based on the return gap between the reported quarterly fund return and the return on a hypothetical portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. As noted by Kacperczyk et al. (2006) , the return gap is affected by a number of unobservable fund actions including security lending, timing of interim trades, IPO allocations, agency costs such as window dressing activities, trading costs and commissions, and investor externalities. While the return gap can gauge the aggregate impact of these unobservable actions on mutual fund performance, the authors note that it is impossible to clearly attribute its effect to any specific action.
Some studies, such as Wermers (2000), have estimated the execution cost of mutual funds using the regression coefficients from Keim and Madhavan (1997) , who examine institutional trading costs for a sample of investors between 1991 and 1993 . Edelen, Evans and Kadlec (2007 propose a new measure that combines changes in quarterly ownership data on a stock-by-stock basis with trading costs estimated for each stock from NYSE TAQ data. However, as acknowledged by these studies, the stock-specific perunit trading costs obtained from NYSE TAQ data or estimated using Keim and Madhavan coefficients would significantly understate the heterogeneity in execution costs across mutual funds. This is because trading costs can vary significant across institutions, even after controlling for stock-specific factors or investment style of the mutual fund, due to differences in the trading skills across institutional desks (see Keim and Madhavan (1997) for empirical evidence).
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The distinguishing feature of our study is that we examine a large sample of institutional tradeby-trade data that allows us to estimate with greater precision the total trading costs, including price impact and commissions, associated with each institution. By analyzing actual institutional trades, we can capture the heterogeneity in trading efficiency or skills across institutional desks. Further, since the dataset contains the complete trading history for each institution, our analysis will capture the entire fund trading activity, including purchases and sales of the same stock made within a quarter, which cannot be observed from changes in quarterly snapshots of mutual fund holdings.
Moreover, the focus of our study differs considerably from related work in the literature. For example, Edelen et al (2007) study the role of trading costs as a source of diseconomies of scale in mutual funds, and show, as modeled in Berk and Green (2004) , that trading cost can be an explanation for the lack of return persistence among high-performing mutual funds. In contrast, we examine separately the role played by broker-execution versus institutional-execution in a single framework and discover persistence in broker and institutional executions, suggesting that trading costs can serve as a partial explanation for mutual fund performance persistence.
The Institutional Trading Process
A typical order originates from the desk of a portfolio manager at a buy-side institution. Portfolio managers hand off the order with some instructions on order urgency (trading horizon) to the buy-side trading desk. The trader makes a set of choices to meet his best execution obligations, including which trading venues to use, whether to split the order over the trading horizon, which broker(s) to select and how much to allocate to each broker. The allocation to the broker, defined in our analysis as a ticket, may in turn result in several distinct trades, or executions, as the broker works the order.
Trading desks and brokers can add value to an institution's portfolio by supplying expertise in execution analysis, offering advanced technological systems, and selecting a strategy that best suits the fund manager's motive for trading. For example, a portfolio manager who wishes to raise cash by doing a program trade, or value managers trading on longer-term information can be better served with passive trading strategies, such as limit orders (see Keim and Madhavan (1995) ). In contrast, portfolio managers who trade on short lived information, or index fund managers who try to replicate a benchmark index might choose aggressive trading strategies, such as market orders, to assure quick execution. 5 The execution problem is especially complicated for orders that are large relative to daily security trading volume. For such orders, the displayed market liquidity is insufficient and it becomes important to signal trading interest in order to draw out reactive traders (Harris (1997) ). However, exposing the order would cause some traders to front run the order and increase the price impact. Large traders may choose to purchase liquidity from a dealer at a premium. More influential institutions could insist that their broker provide capital to facilitate their trades. In an increasingly fragmented marketplace, a trader's skill lies in locating pools of hidden liquidity and responding quickly to order imbalances to obtain the best prices for the portfolio manager (see Bessembinder, Panayides and Venkataraman (2008) ).
Execution Shortfall Measure and Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Execution Shortfall Measure
Our measure of trading cost, the execution shortfall, compares the execution price of a ticket with the stock price when the broker receives the ticket from the client. The choice of a pre-trade benchmark price follows prior literature (see, for example, Keim and Madhavan (1997) , Chan and Lakonishok (1995) ) and relies on the implementation shortfall approach described in Perold (1988) . 6 We define 5 The empirical evidence on a linkage between trader identity and order urgency is relatively weak. Keim and Madhavan (1995) find that institutional investors in their sample trade primarily using market orders and "show a surprisingly strong demand for immediacy, even in those institutions whose trades are based on relatively long-lived information. Consequently, it is rare that an order is not entirely filled". Similarly, Chiyachantana et al. (2004) report that the average fill rate for their sample of institutional orders exceeds 95% for all sample years. The Abel/Noser dataset does not provide information on the unexecuted portion of a ticket. Relying on prior literature, we assume in our analysis that the fill rate for a ticket is 100%. 6 Prior studies (see Berkowitz, Logue and Noser (1988) , Hu (2005) ) have argued that the execution price should be compared with the volume-weighted average price (VWAP), a popular benchmark among practitioners. Madhavan (2002) and Sofianos (2005) present a detailed discussion of VWAP strategies and the limitations of the VWAP benchmark. The most significant limitation is that VWAP can be influenced by the transaction that is being execution shortfall for a ticket as follows:
where P 1 (b,t) Chemmanur and Hu (2007) , and Lipson and Puckett (2007) .
Summary statistics for Abel/Noser trade data are presented in Table 1 . The database contains a total of 739 institutions, responsible for approximately 34 million tickets and leading to 87 million trade executions. For each execution, the database provides the identity of the institution, the broker involved in the trade, the CUSIP and ticker for the stock, the stock price at placement time, date of execution, execution price, number of shares executed, whether the execution is a buy or sell, and the commissions paid. The institution's identity is restricted to protect the privacy of Abel/Noser clients; however, each institution is provided with a unique client code to facilitate identification. 8 Conversations with
Abel/Noser confirm that the database captures the complete history of all transactions of the portfolio evaluated. Also, an execution may outperform the VWAP but in fact may be a poor execution because the trader has delayed the trade and the stock price has moved significantly since the time of the investment decision. 7 Execution Shortfall is analogous to the effective spread measure (see Huang and Stoll (1996) , Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) ) and is interpreted as the price concessions made by a liquidity demander to complete the trade. 8 In addition, the database provides summary execution information for each ticket, including the share-weighted execution price and the total shares executed. Abel/Noser provides two separate reference files -one for broker and the other for client type -that we merge with the original trade data. We use stock and market data from the CRSP and TAQ databases to complement our analysis of the Abel/Noser trade data. We obtain the market capitalization, stock and market returns, daily volume and listing exchange from CRSP, and daily dollar order imbalance from TAQ. Dollar order imbalance is defined as the daily buyer-initiated minus seller-initiated dollar volume of trades scaled by the total dollar volume. TAQ trades are signed as buyer or seller-initiated using the Lee and Ready (1993) algorithm. is coincident with the increase in commission costs that we observe.
To minimize observations with errors, we impose the following screens: (1) Delete tickets with execution shortfall greater than absolute value of 10 percent, (2) Delete tickets with ticket volume greater than the CRSP volume on the execution date, (3) Include common stocks listed on NYSE and NASDAQ, (4) Delete brokers with less than 100 tickets in a month for the broker analysis and delete clients with less than 100 tickets in a month for the client analysis, and (5) Delete all observations where the commission per share for a ticket order is $0.10 or greater.
From Panel C of Table I , we note that the execution shortfall for sell tickets (40 basis points) exceeds those for buy tickets (13 basis points), consistent with Chiyachantana et. al (2004) . This partly reflects the fact that the average sell order is larger than the average buy order. In Panel D, we report summary statistics based on CRSP market capitalization quintiles formed in the month prior to the trading month examined. Although the average ticket size for Small quintile firms is only 8,824 shares, the ticket represents a remarkable 33 percent of the stock's daily trading volume. The average ticket size in Large quintile firms is over 20,000 shares but represents only 1.22 percent of the stocks' daily volume. Clearly, tickets in Small quintile firms are more difficult to execute, experiencing an average execution shortfall of 1.05 percent. In contrast, the execution shortfall for Large quintile firms is only 26 basis points.
Preliminary Examination of Persistence in Broker Execution Shortfall
Table II presents our initial examination of broker persistence in execution shortfall. For each broker, we calculate the execution shortfall for each ticket and then the volume weighted execution shortfall across all tickets for the month. We place brokers based on monthly execution shortfall in quintile portfolios (1-best, 5-worst) during formation month (month M). Table II presents the time series average of equally weighted portfolio performance of brokers in month M and the difference in performance between quintile 1 and quintile 5.
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Not surprisingly, given the idiosyncratic nature of trading performance, there is a large and significant difference in broker quintile execution shortfall in the portfolio formation month of 1.55 percent. The top performing brokers execute trades with a negative execution cost of 56 basis points, while the worst performing broker quintile costs institutional clients an average of 98 basis points.
11 Value weighted construction produces similar results.
However, every random distribution has dispersion and there are a myriad of market conditions that can affect the execution quality of particular trades. Thus, our test of broker outperformance merely uses the portfolio formation month as a benchmark for sorting brokers into performance quintiles.
The key test of broker performance examines whether a quintile's abnormal performance persists into the future. In Table II , we report on the average execution shortfall in future months M+1 through M+4 for brokers sorted into execution quality quintiles in month M. In month M+1, we note that brokers placed in quintile 1 during month M achieve an average execution cost of 4 basis points. In contrast, brokers placed in (worst performing) quintile 5 achieve an average execution cost of 33 basis points. We also note that the execution shortfall in month M+1 increases monotonically from quintile 1 to quintile 5.
The difference in month M+1 performance between quintile 1 and quintile 5 is 29 basis points (t-statistic of difference = 14.10). In further support of broker persistence, we find that trends discussed above continue to be observed in month M+2 through M+4, with the average Q1-Q5 difference in execution quality being 28, 26 and 24 basis points respectively (all statistically significant). Importantly, the difference in execution shortfall of approximately 25 basis points is also economically large.
As additional tests of broker persistence, we examine two statistics, the retention percentage (Retention %) and the percentile rank (Percentile). The Retention % for quintile 1 is the percentage of brokers ranked during month M in quintile 1 who continue to remain in quintile 1 when ranked on execution shortfall in a future month. Retention % helps examine whether both good and poor performance is more persistent than performance in the middle quintiles. As a benchmark, we expect the Retention % to be 20 percent for any quintile in a future month if performance rankings based on month M have no predictive power. However, from Table II , the Retention % in the extreme quintiles are as high as 34 percent, suggesting that broker ranking based on month M is informative about future performance.
The second measure, Percentile rank for quintile 1, reports the average percentile rank based on the execution shortfall estimated in future months for brokers ranked in quintile 1 during month M. By construction, the Percentile for quintile 1 (quintile 5) in month M is 10 (90). Under the null hypothesis that month M rankings have no predictive power, we would expect the Percentile for any broker quintile in future months to be 50. Alternatively, if the month M rankings have predictive power, we expect the Percentile for quintile 1 brokers in future months to be less than 50 (above average) and Percentile for quintile 5 brokers to be greater than 50 (below average). We observe that, consistent with broker performance persistence, the Percentile for quintile's 1 and 5 have significant deviations from 50. These findings provide additional support for persistence in broker performance.
Multivariate analysis of Persistence in Monthly Execution Shortfall
Evidence from Brokers
While section 3 finds broker performance persistence, we don't know why. It is possible that some brokers receive easier to execute tickets than other brokers as a result of their distinct business models (Linnainmaa, 2007) . Therefore, it is important to control for ticket attributes, such as ticket size and direction, as well as stock characteristics, such as market capitalization, stock price and trading volume (Keim and Madhavan (1997) ). Further, institutional trading can be influenced by market conditions, such as stock volatility and short-term price trends (Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu (2003) ), and by the market on which the stock trades (Huang and Stoll (1996) ). Thus, cost comparisons, across brokers and clients or over time, must control for the difficulty of trade.
We estimate monthly, broker fixed-effect, regressions of execution shortfall on the economic determinants of execution shortfall. These variables include stock and market return volatility on the trading day; a Buy indicator variable that equals one if the ticket is a buy order and equals zero otherwise;
the imbalance between buy and sell orders based on the prior trading day; a variable that interacts order imbalance and the buy indicator; stock momentum, measured as the prior day's return; a variable that interacts momentum with the buy indicator; the stock's average daily volume over prior 30 trading days;
stock market capitalization at the beginning of the month; and the inverse of stock price. As a measure of the trade difficulty, we normalize each ticket by the stock's average daily trading volume over prior 30
days. The regression coefficients allow us to estimate the ticket's expected execution cost based on trade difficulty and serves as the benchmark for performance analysis of brokers and institutional clients.
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In and market variables on a common, economically relevant level. We therefore normalize every individual explanatory variable by deducting the sample mean of the explanatory variable for the month, following Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) . Note that only the intercepts are affected by the normalization. In this specification, each broker fixed-effect coefficient can be interpreted as the average execution shortfall for the broker for the month, evaluated at the monthly average of order, firm and market characteristics.
We term the broker coefficients as broker trading alphas, since the cross-sectional variation in broker coefficients can be attributed at least in part to trading skills.
The estimated coefficients for the control variables are of the expected sign and statistically significant; the exception being order imbalance variables that are not significant at the five percent level.
For example, execution shortfall increases with stock volatility, reflecting the higher cost of a delayed trade in volatile markets, but declines with the stock's trading volume. 14 Trading against the previous day's momentum reduces execution cost, while trading with the momentum trend increases execution costs. Seller-initiated orders are more expensive to complete than buyer-initiated orders, reflecting the 12 To explore the possibility of a non-linear relation between the ticket size and execution shortfall, we estimate an alternative model using the log of normalized ticket size (instead of the normalized ticket size). The results are similar to those reported in the paper. 13 We replicate the analysis using an execution shortfall measure that controls for the overall market movement on ticket's execution day, and find similar results. Specifically, following prior literature, we subtract the return on the S&P 500 index from execution shortfall. The adjusted shortfall measure is used as the dependent variable. Such an analysis is appropriate if traders can hedge their exposure to market movements with an offsetting position in the futures market, or through an ETF. 14 The positive coefficient in trading cost regressions on market capitalization with control for trading volume is a common finding in empirical microstructure research (see, Stoll, 2000, for example) . Prior research has attributed this to the high correlation between trading volume and market capitalization.
bearish market conditions during the sample period. Consistent with prior work, NYSE-listed stocks are less expensive to complete than NASDAQ stocks. Finally, execution shortfall costs increase with ticket size, suggesting that larger orders are more expensive to complete.
In Panel B of Table III , we report on tests of persistence in trading alpha. The tests are motivated by the approach outlined for the unadjusted data in Table II . The most striking difference between the two tables is the reduction in the spread during the portfolio formation month between quintile 1 and quintile 5. This difference, which was 155 basis points in Table II , is reduced to 93 basis points using broker alphas. Despite the reduction in spread across quintile portfolios, our persistence conclusions are similar.
In future month M+1, the difference in broker performance between quintile 1 and quintile 5 is 28 basis points (t-statistic of difference = 20.61), which is remarkably similar to the 29 basis points reported in Table II . Persistence is also of similar magnitude for future months M+2 through M+4 (see Figure 1 , Panel A), suggesting that the main conclusions from Table II are robust to controlling for differences across brokers in ticket attributes, stock characteristics and market conditions. Further, we find that the execution shortfall for brokers in quintile 1 is robustly close to zero (p-value > 0.10) for futures months M+1 through M+4. The result that the best brokers in our sample can execute tickets with no price impact is particularly striking since we examine tickets initiated by large institutions. The latter likely reflects the trading skill of brokerage firms in working the order and detecting pools of hidden liquidity.
Consistent with Table II , we find that broker rankings in the portfolio formation month are informative about broker performance in subsequent months. Forty-two percent of the brokers placed in quintile 1 during month M are also ranked independently in the same quintile in future month M+4.
Similarly, almost 33 percent of brokers ranked as the worst performers in month M continue to be ranked as the worst performers in month M+4. We find that, consistent with broker performance persistence, the Percentile for quintile 1 brokers in future months is in the high-30s and the Percentile for quintile 5 brokers is in high 50s. These findings provide strong additional support for broker persistence in execution quality. 15
Evidence from Institutional Clients
Brokers may not be the only source of outperformance in execution quality. Institutional clients themselves may possess above average or below average ability to execute trades. To examine whether institutional clients exhibit persistence in execution shortfall, we repeat the control analysis in Table III, Panel A with institutional client dummy variables rather than broker-specific dummy variables. Following prior notation, we term the coefficient on institutional client dummy variable as the client's trading alpha.
The control regression coefficients are presented in Table IV , Panel A and are quite similar to those presented in Table III , Panel A using broker dummy variables. As before, the only insignificant coefficients are associated with the order imbalance variables. All other coefficients are of similar significance and sign to the results in Table III , Panel A.
Using the client alpha estimates from Table IV 
The Joint Performance of Brokers and Institutional Clients
The results thus far indicate that both brokers and institutional investors exhibit persistence in execution performance. The difference between top-performance and bottom-performance broker or client quintiles is economically large enough to have considerable influence on measures of portfolio performance. The ultimate source of these performance differences cannot be discerned by the results reported thus far as they have only demonstrated that execution cost persistence exists and that it is both statistically and economically significant. If certain brokers are skilled at execution, then perhaps clients of these brokers will tend to exhibit performance persistence. Conversely if certain clients are better traders, perhaps it is the case that clients are skilled and they just tend to concentrate with particular brokers. 17 Alternatively, it is possible that both specific brokers and certain institutions have superior (or inferior) execution performance.
Analysis of Trading Volume Market Share
As a first cut, we examine the routing decisions of clients to see whether the top clients trade predominantly through top brokers, and vice-versa. In Figure 2 , Panel A, we plot the proportion of dollar trading volume routed by a client quintile to each broker quintile, in Month M. Client and Broker quintile rankings are based on independent trading alpha estimates described earlier in Tables III B and from these clients will perform poorly. Clearly, the significant clustering observed in Figure 2 , panel B
suggests that broker performance can be assessed only after controlling for client type.
17 Goldstein et al. (2008) report that institutions tend to heavily concentrate the order flow with few brokers. This concentration causes significant differences in the client lists of brokers and the broker lists of clients.
Evaluating independent patterns in broker and client persistence
Trading performance is a joint production problem as it takes both a broker and an institutional client to execute a ticket order. We attempt to isolate the performance of each contributor to the execution by first, for each portfolio formation month, calculating broker trading alphas and sorting them into quintiles. For each month, we also (independently) calculate client trading alphas and sort them into quintiles. We then use the broker and client quintile designations to assign each ticket to one of 25 quintile intersection (5X5) portfolios. With dummy variables representing each of the 25 portfolios, we estimate trading alpha for each of the 25 portfolios in the portfolio formation month and in months M+1
through M+4 separately. Note that the estimation in months M+1 through M+4 uses portfolios formed on the basis of broker and client rankings in month M.
We use our 25 formation-month portfolios to address the joint production problem in two complementary ways. First, in Table V Conversely, it may be true that certain institutions possess execution skills and when these particular clients concentrate their trading with certain brokers, as observed in Figure 2 Panel B, they produce the patterns in broker performance as observed in Table III Figure 3 that, with each client quintile, we observe a monotonic improvement in performance from the worst to the best performing brokers in future month M+1. These findings provide strong support for an independent broker effect, suggesting that past broker execution performance is informative for future execution performance and should be an important component of the client's order routing decision.
Analysis of Post-trade price drift
Although certain clients consistently obtain poor executions, the clients may not violate their fiduciary
Best Execution obligations if their approach reflects a trading style that realizes the maximum value of the firm's investment ideas. For example, a fund manager who trades on short-term momentum or short lived information may choose aggressive strategies that incur high execution cost but enhance portfolio alpha. 18 As a robustness check, we examine broker persistence in a client fixed effects specification where we include an indicator variable for each client. This specification should control for differences in investment style across clients and examine the performance of brokers within a client. We find that the difference between top and bottom brokers in this specification is 21 basis point (t-statistics=16.33) in M+1 and 18 basis points (t-statistic=14.06) in M+4.
The quintile intersection (5X5) portfolio approach detailed in the prior section controls for client style effects on broker persistence but it does not control for client style effects on client persistence. So, how much of client persistence is driven by their investment style?
Since Abel/Noser data do not reveal client identity, we examine the price patterns observed subsequent to a ticket's execution (post-trade price drift), defined for a ticket as follows:
Post Trade Price drift (b,t) = [(P close (t) -P 1 (b,t)) / P 1 (b,t)] * D(b,t)
where P close (t) is the stock's closing price on the day after the day of ticket execution. If certain clients obtain poor executions due to an urgency in assuming positions reflecting their investment style, we expect to see post-trade price patterns in the direction of the trade (i.e., upward drift for a buy ticket, and vice-versa), or else their urgency in assuming the position seems misplaced. So, if order urgency reflecting client style can explain the client persistence patterns, we expect to see large post trade price drifts for the bottom-performing clients (quintile 5). We report the patterns in post-trade drifts, by quintile intersection (5X5) portfolio, in Month M+1 in Figure 4 . For the top three broker quintiles (Quintiles 1 to 3), the difference in the post-trade drift between top and bottom performing clients is not statistically significant. For broker quintile 4 and 5, the difference is statistically significant but inconsistent with the order urgency hypothesis, since the drift is larger for top performing clients. Thus, our evidence does not provide support for order urgency as an explanation for the poor performance of bottom clients.
To summarize, we observe that both brokers and institutional investors exhibit persistent patterns in execution quality. As seen from Figure 3 , these effects appear to be independent in that neither broker quality nor client quality alone can fully account for them. Further, the combined effects are economically large enough to explain some portion of mutual fund performance persistence. For example, the difference in executions cost between the [top broker, top client] group and the [bottom broker, bottom client] group exceeds 100 basis points. Further, we find robust evidence that the best brokers have the ability to consistently execute trades with no price impact and the best clients have the ability to execute trade with negative price impact. The latter finding implies that trading costs can contribute to positive abnormal performance of institutional clients.
Possible explanations of persistence
What could account for persistent differences in execution quality across brokers and their clients? One possible explanation is that different clients or different brokers trade different stocks, some of which are more difficult to execute than others. However, our control regressions attempt to provide reasonable controls for known ticket, stock and market characteristics that can affect the trade difficulty.
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A second explanation is that some clients pay higher commissions on their trades and receive superior execution from their brokers. As a result, the benefits of the broker's skill in executing the trades is reflected in differences in client's execution costs but the broker captures the surplus and the client is no better off. In Table VI , we report average brokerage commissions in basis points, by quintile intersection (5X5) portfolios, formed during portfolio formation month (similar to Table IV, Panel B).
Several important patterns are observed in Table VI . Within any client quintile, we observe that the pattern in commissions across broker quintiles has a U-shape. If commission payments drive brokers to perform better, we expect commissions to decline monotonically from the top-performing to the bottom-performing broker. The commission patterns are not consistent with this explanation. Neither does the evidence support the explanation that broker incentive is driven by soft dollar arrangements between institutions and brokerage firms. Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2001) show that soft dollar brokers provide worse executions relative to other brokers but also charge more commission than other brokers. But, from Table VI , we see that quintile 5 brokers receive the same (not higher) commissions as other groups and the difference in commissions between top and bottom brokers is not significant for any client quintile. The bottom brokers in our sample do not appear to be predominantly soft dollar brokers.
Moreover, we observe performance persistence for both good and bad brokers. 19 As a robustness check, we run the persistence analysis separately for stocks classified as large cap (size quintile 4 and 5) and small cap stocks and find similar results. For small cap stocks, the performance difference in month M+1 for broker quintiles is 25 basis points and for client quintiles is 66 basis points. Our results are broadly similar when we construct decile (instead of quintile) portfolios of brokers and clients. The performance difference in month M+1 (M+4) between top and bottom broker deciles is 38 (32) basis points and client deciles is 84 (74) basis points.
One possibility is that commissions payments may differ based on services provided to clients.
Indeed, an interesting pattern is observed when we examine commissions paid by clients within a broker quintile. Within broker quintiles, the commissions decline monotonically from top clients to the bottom clients (the t-statistic of difference is greater than 2 for all broker quintiles). If commissions reflect the brokerage effort, one explanation for persistence client patterns is the client's preference for low 'touch' versus high 'touch' executions. Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel and Weiner (2008) report that, in response to ECN competition, full-service brokers now provide a full range of services ranging from low commission (or 'touch') executions such as direct access, dark pools and smart routers to high commission executions such as a sales team working an order or the dealer posting their own capital to facilitate the trade. From Table VI , it appears that bottom-performing clients specify low touch execution venues, perhaps reflecting a focus on explicit costs (commissions). Our evidence suggests that these alternatives can ultimately cost institutions considerably more in price impact (60 basis points, from Table III ) than the explicit savings in commissions (3 basis points, from Table VI) .
A third explanation is focused more on economic incentives and that skill in execution is partly determined by broker effort. Such effort could be related to broker and client size. The largest institutions are important clients generating large total revenues for the broker. Anecdotally, large institutions such as T. Rowe Price and Fidelity are known to punish brokers by withholding business if they feel the broker is leaking information about their trading patterns to the market. Brokers could put up more of their own capital to lower the execution costs of large clients, or brokers could expend greater effort in searching for low-cost counterparties for these clients, actions that suggest larger clients would receive better execution.
Larger brokers may have access to greater networks of counterparties than smaller brokers (Onaran (2007) ). They may also be able to purchase the services of highly-skilled traders. Yet larger brokers have more clients and it is not clear how these resources would be allocated to particular clients.
Small brokers may expend greater effort and secure superior execution for particular clients because these clients are important to them. This is the argument made in Goldstein et al. (2008) who contend that institutions pay premium (relative to ECN execution) commissions in return for a package of broker services, one of which is trading cost minimization. In their argument it is the strength of the client-broker relationship that determines a broker's effort on behalf of a client. The strength of this relationship is determined by the importance to that broker of the client's revenue stream. This argument confounds a simple relationship between broker or client size and execution performance.
To test these ideas, we regress the trading alphas observed for brokers and clients during the portfolio formation month M (i.e., broker and client effects from Table III and Table IV ) on a set of explanatory variables we create to capture the determinants of trading performance. In Table VII , we report the average coefficients across the 84 monthly regressions and the Fama-Macbeth t-statistics and pvalues. The first column presents several variables that reliably predict performance differences across brokers. Broker trading alpha is significantly negatively related to average commissions received by the broker, suggesting that paying higher explicit compensation to brokers tends to improve execution performance. In addition, the dollar size of the ticket is positively related to execution costs, as larger orders are likely to face greater scrutiny from potential counterparties. We find that the number of executions per ticket is negatively related to broker alpha, implying that trading costs decline when the broker breaks up and works the ticket. The variable Herfindahl, calculated for brokers as the Herfindahl index of their trading volume market share across the Fama-French industry groups, is designed to capture the extent of broker specialization in certain sectors. 20 The negative coefficient on Herfindahl suggests that brokers classified as specialists provide better trading performance than brokers classified as generalists. Thus, one possible explanation for client performance is their sophistication in routing orders to boutique brokers who specialize in certain stocks instead of using a generalist broker.
Finally, we gathered annual data on broker Capital from the Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA) which we classify into six categories, ranging from the largest bulge-brokers (such Herfindahl suggests that concentrating the order flow with fewer brokers improves client trading performance. Since the client's identity is unknown, we proxy for client size based on the dollar volume of monthly transactions executed by the client. We also find that large clients are associated with better trading performance, suggesting a client Size effect that is clearer than the broker Capital effect.
The last explanation that we consider is that some buy-side and sell-side trading desks possess superior ability. These abilities could take the form of generally trading against the prevailing market momentum, so that traders in effect are paid for the liquidity they provide rather than having to pay for the liquidity they demand. Essentially this is a market timing skill. Certain clients send orders when the pool of potential counterparties is large or respond quickly to order imbalances. These clients benefit from lower execution costs, or in the case of best clients, earn the liquidity mark-up when demand for immediacy is high. In unreported results, we observe that the greatest effect on client performance in Table VII comes from the omitted variable Momentum. This variable is omitted because our research design removes the effects of momentum on a ticket-by-ticket basis in Table IV Panel A. However, when we remove this variable from our control regression and instead use it as an explanatory variable in this regression, Momentum has a significant positive coefficient that can increase the regression R 2 markedly.
21 Goldstein et al. (2008) find that smaller clients tend to trade with these smaller brokers. If smaller clients are less likely to possess price-relevant information, we can speculate that this result for low capitalization brokers could represent an information effect.
That is, clients who consistently trade stocks in the direction of momentum are demanding liquidity when it is scarce and this liquidity demand significantly raises their trading cost.
Broker persistence and market share
If some brokers are persistently bad, then why do they survive? There is a similar debate in the mutual fund literature on why poorly performing index funds or money market funds survive. For example, Elton, Gruber and Busse (2004) examine S&P 500 index funds and report that the difference in risk across funds is small and the differences in returns are easy to forecast. Yet a large amount of new cash flow goes to the poorest-performing funds leading them to conclude that many investors seem to be making decisions that violate rationality. Further, in a market where arbitrage is impossible, they note that all that is necessary for a dominated product (or service, in this case) to exist and even prosper is a set of uninformed participants. It may thus be the case that bad brokers can survive because some institutions are either performance-insensitive or face substantial information gathering costs. Institutional barriers to order flow (for example, endowments mandated to trade through custody banks) or capacity limitations at good brokerage houses or agency costs can also serve as partial explanations. 22 A more likely explanation is that institutions use order flow to purchase a package of non-execution related services, which would otherwise be expected to be paid more explicitly. Examples of non-execution related arrangements include prime brokerage services such as securities lending and borrowing, allocations in hot IPOs, and access to research reports by sell-side analysts.
We examine the order routing behavior of institutional clients to investigate whether bottom performing brokers get penalized and top performing brokers get rewarded in subsequent periods. For each client, we rank brokers based on cumulative dollar trading volume over a six-month ranking period and identify the ten brokers with volume (top 10 brokers). We relate the execution shortfall with the propensity for a top 10 broker to retain their status during the next six months (the observation period).
Top performing brokers during the ranking period have a 66 percent chance of retaining top 10 status in 22 For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission fined Fidelity investments $8 million in March 2008 because Fidelity had directed trading business to brokerages that enticed Fidelity traders with gifts but not necessarily the best service. The case also led to an industry wide probe of gift-giving practices.
the observation period. In contrast, bottom performing brokers have a 60 percent chance of retaining their top 10 status (the difference is statistically significant at 1 percent level). We also examine the propensity for a non-top 10 broker during the ranking period to achieve a top 10 status in the observation period. Top (bottom) performing brokers exhibit a likelihood of 6.49 percent (6 percent) of achieving top 10 status in the observation period (the difference is significant at the 1 percent level).
We also examine the change in trading volume market share of brokers from the ranking to the observation period. Brokers ranked as two best performing quintiles see an increase in market share, from from 12.95 to 13.32 percent for quintile 1 and from 22.86 to 23.32 percent for quintile 2. In contrast, brokers ranked as two worst performers see a decrease in market share, from 25.12 to 24.78 percent for quintile 4 and from 14.38 to 13.97 percent for quintile 5. Although the analysis focuses on a relatively short window, our findings indicate that routing decisions are sensitive to past execution quality, suggesting that institutional clients associate past execution quality with broker skill and not simply order difficulty. 23 Thus, our evidence suggests that bad brokers lose market share slowly.
Conclusion
Recent research on mutual fund performance suggests that funds can sustain relative performance beyond expenses or momentum over adjacent periods. This study examines whether the trading costs incurred in the implementation of investment ideas can serve as one source of mutual fund persistence.
We examine equity transactions of institutional investors using data provided by Abel/Noser Corporation, a consulting firm that works with institutional investors to monitor their equity trading costs.
Our main results show that the past broker or client execution quality helps predict future execution quality. Specifically, brokers ranked as top performers in month M outperform brokers ranked as bottom performers by 28 basis points over adjacent months. For institutional clients, the execution cost differential between the top and bottom performers is even larger, at 62 basis points. We find that the broker and institutional client persistence results are independent and that institutional routing decisions are sensitive to past execution quality. We examine the broker and client characteristics that correlate with execution performance. The best brokers tend to specialize in certain industries, charge higher commission, have a higher propensity to work the order, and are able to consistently execute trades with no price impact. The best performing clients tend to be larger, concentrate order flow with fewer brokers, and can robustly obtain negative trading costs, suggesting that their trading desks help create positive (investment) alpha through their trading strategies. The worst clients tend to specify low commission execution venues, suggesting a focus on explicit costs.
The cumulative dollar impact of the trading cost difference is large -an approximate calculation suggests that the annual trading cost reductions exceed $1 billion if institutions begin to route order flow to top brokers instead of bottom brokers. 24 While this estimate is no doubt imprecise, the magnitude of the estimate emphasizes that the careful evaluation of broker selection represents an important dimension of institutional investors' Best Execution obligation. However, because brokers provide a package of nonexecution related services to clients, we cannot necessarily conclude from this analysis that clients have violated the best execution obligations to their investors.
One caveat should be noted. Since we do not know the identity of the institutions in our data, we cannot determine the size of the institution and the institution's turnover rate. Thus, trading activity in our data cannot be directly translated into mutual fund abnormal returns. All that we can note is that, given the average mutual fund turnover rate, which can approach 100 percent annually, (Edelen et al. (2007)), the persistent difference in execution cost that we estimate can help explain a significant portion of the difference in fund performance reported in the existing literature. 24 A broker ranked as a bottom performer in our sample executes roughly $700 million each month, or $8.4 annually. In a typical month, we have roughly 50 brokers in the bottom quintile. Thus, brokers in the bottom quintile in our sample execute roughly $420 billion each year. In Table III , Panel B, we estimate trading cost difference of approximately 28 basis points per ticket between the top and the bottom brokers. If institutions route orders to top brokers instead of bottom brokers, we estimate that trading cost reductions from this order flow to be $1.18 billion. A similar approach can be used to estimate dollar amounts for other quintiles. Moreover, these amounts understate the true benefit of broker selection since our sample contains only a portion of the institutional order flow. Tables III B and IV B) using client and broker dummy variables. Next, we use the rankings associated with each broker and client in each month and assign each broker-client combination into one of 25 categories. Then for each month, we estimate regressions using the execution shortfall as the dependent variable, and the control variables described earlier as well as the 25 broker-client combination dummies as the independent variables (this specification excludes broker and client dummy variables). We use each month's broker-client combination ranking in month M to estimate similar regression for the next month. Our methodology produces 25 coefficient estimates (that represent all possible client-broker rank combinations) for the formation month (month M) and the subsequent month (month M+1). We report the coefficients estimated for the subsequent month for all 25 fractile categories in Figure 1 . Tables III B and IV B) using client and broker dummy variables. Next, we use the rankings of execution shortfall associated with each broker and client in each month and assign each broker-client combination into one of 25 categories. Then for each month, we estimate post-trade drift for all executions in the 25 broker-client categories, and compute an equal-weighted average for each category. We exclude clients or brokers from a month if they have fewer than 100 ticket orders.
Table I Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics for our sample of institutional trades from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2005. We use a ticket as our level of analysis. A ticket could be executed through multiple trades. We further restrict the sample to tickets that are executed by brokers with at least 100 tickets during a particular month, as well as to tickets executed on NYSE/NASDAQ stocks. We present the results for the full sample, as well as by disaggregating the sample based on year, order direction, and firm size quintiles. Firm size quintiles are based on the stocks in our sample. Execution shortfall is measured as the difference between the execution price and the stock price when the broker receives the order from the institutional client for buy orders, and the difference between the market price at time of order placement and the execution price for sell orders, divided by the stock price. Commissions are reported in dollars per share. We report the volume weighted averages for execution shortfall and commissions. Table 2 examines the persistence of monthly broker execution shortfall. The trades in the sample are executed by 431 different brokerage firms during the time period from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2005. Execution shortfall is measured for buy tickets as the execution price minus the market price at the time of ticket placement divided by the market price at ticket placement (for sell tickets we multiply by -1). We calculate the average execution shortfall across all ticket orders for each brokerage firm each month. At the end of the each month, we divide all brokerage firms into five quintiles based on the average execution shortfall for all ticket orders. We then report the average (equal-weighted) execution shortfall for these quintiles in the portfolio formation month and the next four months. We also include the percentage of brokerage firms that end up in the same quintile during subsequent months (Retention %) and the average percentile rank of quintile brokerage firms (Percentile). We exclude a brokerage firm from a month if it has fewer than 100 ticket orders. All numbers are in percent. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. This table reports coefficient estimates from monthly broker fixed-effects regression of execution shortfall on economic determinants of execution shortfall. The model is estimated for each of the 84 month in our sample. We present the average coefficients across 84 months, and the Fama-Macbeth t-statistics and p-values associated with the coefficients. We also report the proportion of coefficients that are positive. Daily return, daily S&P return, daily volume and market values are obtained from the CRSP database. The Buy dummy equals 1 for buy orders and 0 for sell orders. The order direction is given in the Abel/Noser database. Order imbalance is the dollar imbalance on the day prior to the day a ticket is executed. The dollar imbalance is calculated using TAQ data, and is defined as the difference of the dollar volume of buyer initiated trades and the dollar volume of seller initiated trades, divided by the total dollar volume of buyer and seller initiated trades. Trades are assigned as buyer or seller initiated using the Lee-Ready (1991) algorithm. Momentum is measured using the stock's return on the day prior to the ticket execution date. The return is obtained from the daily CRSP database. All explanatory variables are demeaned each month so that each broker coefficient measures the execution shortfall for an average order for the broker. All independent variables are de-meaned and our regression includes dummy variables for each brokerage firm. The coefficient estimate on brokerage firm dummy variables is the brokerage firm's Trading Alpha. Each month we divide all brokerage firms into five quintiles based on their Trading Alpha estimates. We then report the average (equal-weighted) Trading Alpha for these quintiles for the portfolio formation months and the next four months. We also include the percentage of brokerage firms that end up in the same quintile during subsequent months (Retention %) and the average percentile rank of quintile brokerage firms (Percentile). We exclude a brokerage firm from a month if it has fewer than 100 ticket orders. All returns are in percent. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. This table reports coefficient estimates from monthly client fixed-effects regression of execution shortfall on economic determinants of execution shortfall. The model is estimated for each of the 84 month in our sample. We present the average coefficients across 84 months and the Fama-Macbeth t-statistics and p-values associated with the coefficients. We also report the proportion of coefficients that are positive. Daily return, daily S&P return, daily volume and market values are obtained from the CRSP database. The Buy dummy equals 1 for buy orders and 0 for sell orders. The order direction is given in the Abel/Noser database. Order imbalance is the dollar imbalance on the day prior to the day a ticket is executed. The dollar imbalance is calculated using TAQ data, and is defined as the difference of the dollar volume of buyer initiated trades and the dollar volume of seller initiated trades, divided by the total dollar volume of buyer and seller initiated trades. Trades are assigned as buyer or seller initiated using the Lee-Ready (1991) algorithm. Momentum is measured using the stock's return on the day prior to the ticket execution date. The return is obtained from the daily CRSP database. All explanatory variables are demeaned each month so that each client coefficient measures the execution shortfall for an average order for the client. Trading Alpha is estimated for each client in each month using the cross-sectional regression presented in Panel A. All independent variables are de-meaned and our regression includes dummy variables for each client. The coefficient estimate on client dummy variables is the client's Trading Alpha. Each month we divide all clients into five quintiles based on their Trading Alpha estimates. We then report the average (equal-weighted) Trading Alpha for these quintiles for the portfolio formation months and the next four months. We also include the percentage of clients that end up in the same quintile during subsequent months (Retention %) and the average percentile rank of quintile clients (Percentile). We exclude a client from a month if it has fewer than 100 ticket orders. All returns are in percent. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Tables III B  and IV B) using client and broker dummy variables. Next, we use the rankings associated with each broker and client in each month and assign each broker-client combination into one of 25 categories. Then for each month, we estimate regressions using the execution shortfall as the dependent variable, and the control variables described earlier as well as the 25 broker-client combination dummies as the independent variables (this specification excludes broker and client dummy variables). We use each month's broker-client combination ranking to estimate similar regression for the next 4 months. Our methodology produces 25 coefficient estimates (that represent all possible client-broker rank combinations) for the formation month (t) and the subsequent four months. For each period and brokerage firm quintile, we hold the broker ranking constant and report the difference between the highest client quintile (quintile=1) and lowest client quintile (quintile=5). We exclude clients or brokers from a month if they have fewer than 100 ticket orders. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Tables III  B and IV B) using client and broker dummy variables. Next, we use the rankings associated with each broker and client in each month and assign each broker-client combination into one of 25 categories. Then for each month, we estimate regressions using the execution shortfall as the dependent variable, and the control variables described earlier as well as the 25 broker-client combination dummies as the independent variables (this specification excludes broker and client dummy variables). We use each month's broker-client combination ranking to estimate similar regression for the next 4 months. Our methodology produces 25 coefficient estimates (that represent all possible client-broker rank combinations) for the formation month (t) and the subsequent four months. For each period and client quintile, we hold the client ranking constant and report the difference between the highest broker quintile (quintile=1) and lowest broker quintile (quintile=5). We exclude clients or brokers from a month if they have fewer than 100 ticket orders. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Table VII presents cross-sectional regressions where the monthly estimated Broker (Client) trading alpha is the dependent variable. Herfindahl for Brokers captures the concentration of trading by FF industry groups, while for clients captures the concentration of trading volume among brokerage firms. Commission is the average commission (in percent) of all ticket orders for the broker (client) in the month. Ticket Size is the average dollar value of all ticket orders for the broker (client) in the month. Execution per ticket is the average number of executions for each ticket order during the month. Number of clients is the total number of clients that traded with a broker in a month, while number of brokers is the total number of brokers that traded with a client in a month. Broker capital categories are constructed from external capital variables obtain from FINRA, while Client size quintiles are based on the total dollar value of monthly trading for a client. We present the average coefficients across 84 months and the Fama- 
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